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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
GALEN L. JONAS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880411-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Issues, 
Statement of the Case, and Statement of the Facts are set forth in 
Appellant's opening Brief at 1-7. Appellant takes this opportunity 
to briefly reply to Respondents arguments in Points III and V of 
its Brief. All issues not discussed in this Reply Brief are 
adequately outlined in Appellant's opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A review of the record establishes that defense counsel 
made a contemporaneous challenge to Juror Smith and that the basis 
of the challenge was clearly outlined. 
The State acknowledges that the unauthorized contact 
raised a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. The appropriate 
inquiry under State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), after such a 
presumption is raised is whether the State sustained its burden of 
establishing that the defendant was not prejudiced. The State's 
contention that actual prejudice must be shown is not supported by 
the case law. In this case, the State did not sustain its burden of 
rebutting the presumption of prejudice. 
Use of affidavits is appropriate in Rule 11 proceedings. 
Availability of trial counsel by telephone does not do away with the 
hardships of having new counsel on appeal where issues regarding the 
adequacy of the trial transcript exist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENSE COUNSEL PRESERVED THE ISSUE 
REGARDING HIS CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE OF JUROR SMITH 
FOR APPEAL. 
(Reply to Point III in Respondent's Brief) 
In its response, the State takes the position that trial 
counsel did not make a specific contemporaneous challenge to Juror 
Smith (Respondent's Brief at 3 0-1). The portions of the record 
quoted in the State's brief at 30-1 establish that trial counsel 
preserved this issue in the only available and practical manner 
given the reality of a trial setting. Those portions of the record 
also establish that trial counsel did in fact make a contemporaneous 
challenge. 
In the interest of efficiency and to alleviate the need 
for physically removing the jury from the courtroom, the usual 
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practice in a criminal trial is to make challenges for cause at the 
bench, outside the hearing of the jury, with the understanding that 
the challenging party will later be given the opportunity to place 
his challenges on the record and still preserve the argument for 
appeal. The necessity of "moving the trial along" and minimizing 
the number of times the jury is removed from the courtroom demands 
that, at times, attorneys make objections at the bench and preserve 
them by agreeing to later place them on the record. 
In this case, at the conclusion of voir dire, the usual 
discussion (where challenges for cause are made) was held at the 
bench (R. 270 at 44). The next day, the court allowed trial counsel 
to place his challenges on the record (R. 267 at 186-7, quoted in 
Respondent's Brief at 3 0-1). The statements made by the court and 
defense counsel establish that all parties knew the basis of the 
challenge, that the challenge was made immediately after voir dire 
was completed, and the trial judge agreed to preserve the issue by 
later putting it on the record. At the conclusion of defense 
counsel's summary of the timing of his objection and the basis for 
the challenge, the trial judge stated, "The record may so show" 
(R. 267 at 187) . Therefore, the record establishes that defense 
counsel made a timely challenge and the State's argument is without 
merit. 
If this Court were to rule that a defendant must place 
his challenges or objections on the record immediately and that the 
parties and trial court are not free to agree that an objection made 
at the bench can later be placed on the record and still be 
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preserved for appeal, trials in the future would be needlessly and 
repeatedly interrupted so that jurors could be removed from the 
courtroom and the objection placed on the record. 
The efficient procedure utilized in this case leaves no 
question to either this Court or the trial court as to whether 
counsel contemporaneously challenged Juror Smith and was an 
effective means for preserving this issue for appeal. Furthermore, 
the trial judge and anyone reviewing this record were clearly 
informed of the basis of defense counsel's challenge. Defense 
counsel pointed out that the juror had been burglarized, had 
indicated that "she did not think she could be fair and impartial,11 
and that he had excepted to her at the end of the voir dire based on 
"an implied bias of that particular juror" (R. 267 at 186-7). 
Although the State contends this was not a clear objection or too 
generalized a challenge, it is not clear what else the State thinks 
defense counsel could or should have said regarding this issue. 
Given the realities of the trial setting and the interest 
in efficiency, the challenge was adequately and timely raised. 
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO REBUT THE 
PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE RAISED BY THE IMPROPER 
CONTACT BETWEEN THE BAILIFF AND THE JURORS. 
(Reply to Point V in Respondent's Brief; 
Issue Raised as Point IV in Appellant's Opening Brief) 
The State agrees that "it is reasonable to classify the 
encounter as one in which a rebuttable presumption of prejudice 
would arise.11 Resp. Br. at 45. Since the rebuttable presumption 
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arises only where the contact "goes beyond a mere incidental, 
unintended contact" (State v. Erickson, 749 P. 2d 620, 621 (Utah 
1987)), the State appears to be conceding that this contact was 
significant enough to get over the first hurdle enunciated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Pike, 712 P. 2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) 
("[P]resumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact 
during a trial between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and 
jurors which goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended and brief 
contact"). 
Although the State agrees that the presumption was raised 
in this case, it claims that Pike requires a second factual 
determination as to whether actual prejudice occurred before a case 
can be reversed based on the unauthorized contact. The State's 
position is that "even when a rebuttable prejudice arises, a factual 
evaluation must still be made to determine if in fact the contact 
influenced the jurors, rendering them impartial." Resp. Br. at 40. 
The State's position misreads Pike and its predecessors 
and outlines a requirement that is not established by Utah case 
law. In Pike, the Court made it clear that once a presumption of 
prejudice is raised, the State has the burden of establishing that 
the defendant was not prejudiced. The State argues exactly the 
opposite—that the defendant must still establish actual prejudice. 
Such a reading of Pike and related Utah cases would make the 
presumption outlined in Pike meaningless and ignores the concerns 
and rationale for such a presumption as articulated in Pike. 
In State v. Pike, the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
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rationale for the presumption (1) "the inherent difficulty in 
proving how or whether a juror has in fact been influenced by 
conversing with a participant in the trial " (712 P.2d at 280, 
citing State v. Anderson. 237 P. 941, 943 (Utah 1925)), and (2) "the 
deleterious effect upon the judicial process because of the 
appearance of impropriety." Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Because of the 
inherent difficulty in establishing influence on a juror, a 
defendant may never be able to show the actual prejudice which the 
State argues is required. Furthermore, an appearance of impropriety 
has nothing to do with actual prejudice but has a concern for the 
sanctity of the trial process. 
In State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977), relied 
upon heavily by the State in support of its theory, the Utah Supreme 
Court expressed concern about the appearance of impropriety created 
by improper contacts as well as actual prejudice to a defendant. 
The right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury 
is an important one which should be scrupulously 
safeguarded (footnote omitted). This applies not 
only to actual fairness and impartiality, but any 
conduct that may seem to give an appearance to the 
contrary should be avoided. 
569 P.2d at 1109. The Pike Court cited Durand for the proposition 
that 
[A]nything more than the most incidental contact 
during the trial between witnesses and jurors 
casts doubt upon the partiality of the jury and at 
best gives the appearance of the absence of 
impartiality. 
Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. Hence, Pike's reliance on Durand does not 
support the State's argument and, instead, establishes the 
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opposite—that a defendant does not have an obligation to establish 
actual prejudice because an appearance of impropriety may be 
sufficient to require a new trial. 
The State's reliance on Durand in support of its proposal 
is also misplaced because the decision in Durand had nothing to do 
with lack of actual prejudice or a second factual evaluation. 
Instead, as pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Pike, the 
claims in Durand failed because the nature of the contact was brief 
and incidental. See Pike. 712 P.2d at 280, footnote 1. Hence, the 
presumption was never raised in Durand. 
The State's reliance on State v. Black, 551 P.2d 518, 519 
(Utah 1976), and State v. Garcia. 355 P.2d 57 (1960), cert, denied, 
366 U.S. 970 (1961), is similarly misplaced. The Pike Court 
explicitly pointed out that a presumption was never raised in Black 
and that the case was decided based on the brief and incidental 
nature of the contact. Pike. 712 P.2d at 280, footnote 1. A review 
of Garcia, another pre-Pike case, suggests that it, too, was decided 
based on the brief and incidental nature of the contact between a 
juror and the judge. 
Nor do the other cases cited by the State support its 
argument for a tighter and more confusing analysis than mandated by 
Pike. The Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Parsons. 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 19, 25 (1989) based on trial counsel's waiver of the issue 
on the record at the sentencng proceeding. Although in dictum, the 
court does state that "[e]ven analyzing the facts under the 
standards provided in State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 
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1985), we could find no error," such statement does not support the 
State's theory that Pike requires a second factual analysis for 
actual prejudice. In fact, a review of the facts regarding the 
contact in Parsons suggests that the court's statement could be 
based either on (1) the brief and incidental nature of the contact 
failing to raise a presumption or (2) the State's rebuttal of the 
presumption based on defendant's statement that no prejudice 
occurred. 
The Utah Supreme Court based its decision in State v. 
Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987) on the State's failure to 
rebut the presumption, not on any finding of actual prejudice. 
Similarly, although the pre-Pike case of State v. Anderson, 2 37 P. 
941 (Utah 1925), does not specifically discuss a presumption of 
prejudice, it fits within the Pike framework in that the contact 
raised the presumption and the State did not rebut that presumption. 
In State v. Larocco. 742 P.2 89 (Utah App. 1987), cert, 
granted 765 P.2d 1277 (1988), cited by the State at page 44 of its 
Brief, this Court refused to reverse the defendant's conviction 
based on the unauthorized contact between a juror and a witness. 
Each judge wrote a separate opinion; two of the judges determined 
that the State had sustained its burden, while a third dissented 
based on the State's failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice 
raised by the contact. None of the judges discussed an objective 
test for actual prejudice as suggested by the State. Resp. Br. at 
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44.1 
Contrary to the State's assertion that a complete review 
of Utah case law supports its argument that a second inquiry 
involving actual prejudice is required, a thorough review of Utah 
case law establishes the opposite—that no actual prejudice is 
required and that once the presumption is raised, a failure by the 
State to rebut the presumption requires reversal.2 
The State's argument confuses and obscures what is a 
relatively simple test under Pike. That test is (1) is a 
presumption of prejudice raised because the contact goes beyond a 
brief and incidental one, and (2) if the presumption was raised, did 
the State rebut it? 
In this case, as outlined in Appellant's opening Brief at 
27-9 and conceded by the State at page 45 of its Brief, the contact 
was more than brief and incidental and raised a presumption of 
1
 This Court's decision in Larocco on this issue is 
currently being reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to a 
writ of certiorari. 
2
 The only arguable support for such a requirement is 
dictim in Durand that the Court will not reverse a conviction 
"unless it appears that a party has been prejudiced [footnote 
omitted] in that in the absence of such impropriety there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different." 
Durand, 569 P.2d at 1109. However, since the Durand decision was 
based on the brief and incidental nature of the contact, this 
language does not support an argument that a second factual 
prejudice prong is required. In addition, the Pike Court did not 
rely on this language and, in fact, took the opposite approach—that 
once the presumption was raised, the State had the burden of 
establishing prejudice. 
The federal approach and whether there is a split in the 
federal circuit courts is irrelevant to this issue. Pike 
definitively outlines the applicable approach in the state of Utah. 
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prejudice,3 Although the State claims that the "extrinsic" nature 
of the information precludes reversal, case law does not support 
such an argument. The "bunged toe" information in Pike was 
extrinsic, as were the Anderson conversations and the Erickson 
discussion. Once the presumption is raised, the State must do more 
than argue the incidental nature of the information in order to 
rebut the presumption. 
The State suggests that "the only impact that the 
information could have on the jury was to generally inflame them 
against anyone charged with a crime." Resp. Br. at 46. In an 
effort to minimize such impact, the State argues that the jury had 
already responded on voir dire that they held no presumptive 
feelings of guilt towards the Appellant despite his being charged 
and would accord him the full presumption of innocence." Resp. Br. 
at 46. Such response is irrelevant to a determination as to whether 
the State rebutted the presumption that the bailiff's unauthorized 
contact prejudiced the jury. Appellant is not arguing that a 
tainted jury was initially selected; instead, Appellant is arguing 
that this unauthorized contact tainted the jury. 
As the State acknowledges, the information could inflame 
the jury against anyone charged with a crime. The court did not 
question the jurors following the unauthorized contact to determine 
3
 Appellant continues to maintain that the exact nature 
of the information conveyed to the jury is unclear due to the 
deficiences in the transcript (see Point IV in Appellant's opening 
Brief). However, at a minimum, the jurors were informed that Juror 
Davis' pregnant sister had been shot and killed in a video store 
robbery over the weekend. 
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whether they were so affected (TR. 1-6). Because the State has the 
burden of proving lack of prejudice, such deficiency must be 
attributed to the State, not the Appellant. 
Nor does the fact that the jury acquitted Mr. Jonas on a 
number of charges establish that this information did not affect the 
jurors. Absent the information and taint, they may well have 
acquitted Mr. Jonas of all charges, not just those corroborated by 
Officer Brown. 
POINT III. THE TRANSCRIPT WAS INADEQUATE. 
(Reply to Point IV in Respondent's Brief; 
Issue at Point V in Appellant's Opening Brief) 
The State seems to take issue with Appellant's use of 
affidavits in the proceedings under Rule 11, Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals to establish that the record was not a correct reflection 
of what occurred in court. Resp. Br. at 39, footnote 9. However, 
the Rule itself seems to contemplate the use of affidavits. 
Rule 11(g) allows a party to prepare a statement of evidence and 
serve it on the opposing party. Indeed, the most efficient and 
practical procedure for handling the issues raised in this case was 
by affidavit. Furthermore, appellate counsel was under the 
impression that the parties and the trial judge agreed that this was 
the appropriate manner in which to proceed. The State did not raise 
an objection at the hearing and the trial judge accepted and 
reviewed the affidavits. 
The specific procedure applicable under Rule 11 and the 
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confines of that Rule have not been litigated,, If this Court should 
decide that the use of affidavits was not appropriate, Appellant 
respectfully requests that this Court remand the case to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing so that it can establish through 
live testimony the information contained in the affidavits. 
The State also suggests that trial counsel was available 
by telephone and Appellant, therefore, was not impacted by the 
change in counsel on appeal. Resp. Br. at 35, footnote 8; 39, 
footnote 9. The availability of trial counsel by telephone is 
entirely distinct from having counsel working intricately with the 
transcript and case law and briefing the issues on appeal. 
Appellate counsel had the disadvantage of not being present during 
the proceedings and therefore not familiar with what may or may not 
have transpired. Although trial counsel was available by telephone, 
he did not recall details of the trial. The cases cited by 
Appellant at 42, United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 
1977), and Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964), 
acknowledge the hardships faced by appellate counsel who did not 
represent a defendant at trial and do not turn on the ability of 
such appellate counsel to talk to trial counsel by telephone. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, GALEN L. JONAS, requests that his convictions 
be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for dismissal 
or a new trial. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this g? day of January, 1990. Q_ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that eight copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and 
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this Q day of January, 1990. 
Jib AN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
of January, 1990. 
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